After the end of the unsuccessful war with Japan for Russia, a set of measures was taken that were carried out from 1905-1912. and touched upon various aspects of the Russian armed forces. In particular, with the introduction of the territorial recruitment system, the centralization of military command was strengthened; The terms of service in the army and navy were shortened, the officer corps was rejuvenated; new programs for military schools, new regulations and models of artillery pieces were adopted; heavy field artillery was created, engineering troops were strengthened and material support was improved; reconstruction of fleets in the Pacific and Baltic, which suffered heavy losses in ships.
In 1912, under the leadership of General M.A. Belyaev in Russia, a “Great Program to Strengthen the Army” was developed. In March - October 1913, the provisions of the program were approved by NicholasII, however, it was approved only on June 24, 1914, when before the startPThe First World War was just over a month away.
“Two more years of peace, and Russia, with its 180 million souls, would have such a powerful army in numbers, education and supplies that it would be able, in its own interests, to give direction to the solution of all political issues of the European continent.”
V. A. Sukhomlinov - Minister of War of Russia in 1909-1915.
On the eve of the war, Russia arrived with a peacetime army of 1 million 423 thousand people. After mobilization it amounted to about 6 million people. In total, during the First World War, almost 16 million people were mobilized into the Russian army. All of the above figures exceeded those of any of the warring countries during the war.
General Alexey Aleksevich Brusilov
In historical and journalistic literature one can find two polar points of view on the command staff of the Russian army during the First World War. The first represented the officers and generals as people endowed with outstanding qualities. According to the second point of view, the commanders of the first half of the 1910s. Quite often they were mediocrities, and even mediocrities. Of course, the bulk of the Russian command staff was neither one nor the other. These were professional military men, graduates of specialized military institutions, for whom military affairs became a profession (it is difficult to blame L.G. Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I. Denikin, A.V. Samsonov, A.A. Brusilov for unprofessionalism and etc.). It was they who would subsequently form the backbone of the command staff during the civil war for both the “whites” and the “reds”.
Huge losses among the personnel of the Russian army already in the first year of the war led to the fact that after mobilization in the army there was an increase in the proportion of the peasant population, half of whom were illiterate. This did not prevent the Russian soldier from being brave and persistent on the battlefield, but at the same time he had to confront the German soldier, who at that time was the product of one of the most technically trained nations in the world. And here such categories as endurance, patience, obedience, characteristic of the communal psychology of the Russian warrior, turned out to be insufficient in the beginning war of technology.
The main tactical unit of the Russian army was the infantry division, numbering 14.5 thousand people, which, as a rule, consisted of four infantry regiments. The main weapon of the Russian army was the three-line Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, which was distinguished by its simplicity and reliability, and its undemanding manufacturing technology. Unfortunately, especially in the first years of the war, due to various circumstances in the Russian army there was not only an understaffing, but sometimes even a catastrophic shortage of rifles among the rank and file of infantrymen. More advanced rifles by V.G. were tested in 1912. Fedorov and F.V. Tokarev were not accepted for mass production either before or during the war.
Model 1891 Mosin rifle
In addition, Japanese Arisaka rifles, captured Austro-Hungarian Mannlicher rifles, German Mauser, Winchester rifles, mainly late X modifications were used to varying degreesIXcentury, but their use was secondary to the Mosin rifle.
By July 1914, the Russian army had 4,157 machine guns in service (mainly the Maxim, Vickers, Colt-Browning, Shosha, etc. machine guns), which was clearly not enough to meet the needs of the army - this the problem would persist throughout the war, even despite the influx of captured weapons and allied supplies from France and the United States.
Perhaps one of the problematic types of troops in Russia on the eve of the First World War was artillery. The roots of these problems are in outdated pre-war ideas about the nature of war. The prevailing fascination was theories about the omnipotence of the Russian bayonet strike, the belief that not a single enemy was able to withstand it, therefore, the fate of the war would be decided by quick surprise strikes in field battle. Artillery was in the process of being formed, especially heavy artillery. In addition, the problem of a lack of shells very quickly arose. Already at the end of 1914, the need was determined at 1.5 million shells per month. It was not possible to meet this need with the help of the domestic military industry. In the future, they will try to partially compensate for the problem with the lack of shells due to increased production volumes and allied supplies of weapons, but it will not be possible to fully resolve it.
By the beginning of the twentieth century. Such a branch of troops as cavalry lost its former importance. During the First World War, although cavalry was the only mobile branch of the military, numerically it constituted no more than 10% of the armies of the warring countries. The peculiarities of military operations during the war (active use of artillery, machine guns, aviation) led to large losses of personnel and horses, which made this branch of the military ineffective. The numerous Russian cavalry (36 cavalry divisions, 200 thousand people) as a result, in fact, was sometimes forced to turn into infantrymen, fighting from the trenches. It should be noted that two-thirds of the entire Russian cavalry were Cossack cavalry. For the Cossacks, given the high percentage of equestrian units among them and the traditions of horse breeding, it was most difficult for the Cossacks to adapt to the changing nature of the war. Often the Cossacks were not psychologically ready to “get off the horse,” perceiving this as a kind of betrayal of age-old foundations.
Don Cossack Kozma (Kuzma) Firsovich Kryuchkov - the first Knight of St. George among the lower ranks of the Russian army
The First World War actually only marked the use of motor vehicles in war conditions. Only on the eve of the war was the “Regulation on Military Automobile Conscription” approved, which provided for the transfer of all privately owned vehicles to the army by the civilian population upon the announcement of mobilization, with compensation to the owners for their cost. After the start of the war, in accordance with this provision, 3.5 thousand cars and 475 trucks were confiscated from the population. In wartime conditions, vehicles equipped with guns, including anti-aircraft guns, began to be created. Ambulance squads also provided great assistance in the field army.
First World War ambulance car
One of the problems that constantly existed throughout the First World War was the organization of supplies for the Russian army. Difficulties with transport support can be explained by the enormous distances over which transportation had to be carried out in Russia - they were 3-4 times greater than in Germany. Unfortunately, corruption and mercantile factors were also widespread in supply issues. It has long been no secret that war is one of the ways to get rich (this is clearly seen in the example of the United States, which, as a result of the First World War, turned from debtors into the world's largest creditors). The condition of the tracks and locomotives did not contribute to the normal operation of railway transport (it was the main transport for transportation) (in 1914 in East Prussia, the Russian army was faced with the problem of inconsistency of the railway track in Russia and Germany, which actually reduced the efficiency of transportation several times troops and supplies on enemy territory). To this should be added the climatic features of Russia - the long duration of the winter period and lower winter temperature conditions, which means the need for greater use of fuel (coal, first of all). All this naturally increased costs, both time and financial. Repeated attempts to establish normal supplies between the rear and the front were unsuccessful.
A loyal soldier tries to stop deserters
February Revolution of 1917, abdication of NicholasII, and then his brother Mikhail from the Russian throne led to significant changes in the Russian army. Order No. 1, which actually removed soldiers from the authority of commanders, contributed to a sharp decline in discipline and combat effectiveness of the army. The army was negatively impacted by incessant propaganda from various parties, which was anti-government and anti-militaristic in nature. Since the spring of 1917, desertion increased even more (by November 1917, there were about 1.5 million registered deserters), facts of “fraternization at the front” and voluntary surrender became frequent. The Russian army was close to collapse.
Ph.D. Vladimir Gizhov,
Alexander Gizhov.
Specially for the magazine “Russian Horizon”
Before we begin to consider the fighting on the Eastern Front during the First World War, it is necessary to remember/find out/explain/tell (underline as appropriate) what the Russian Imperial Army represented during this period.
Many sources (both imported and domestic) say a lot that before the First World War the Russian Imperial Army was the largest, but the most backward in armament in Europe.
After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, it became clear that the army needed reforms.
In March 1909, General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov was appointed Minister of War, and military reform received priority status.
Why not earlier?
From 1905 to 1907, the events of the First Russian Revolution took place in the country, and there was, to put it mildly, no time for reforms. When passions have subsided, the time has come to think about the army in order to avoid defeats like the Russo-Japanese War, although we question the loss in military terms. Here, rather, there was a political defeat.
It is also worth noting that during this period the Main Directorate of the General Staff was created, which was separated from the War Ministry.
All functions and issues of preparing the country for war were transferred to the first. The second is left with the administrative part and farming.
In parallel with military reform, it was necessary to carry out accelerated development of industry.
It is no secret to anyone today that Russia at that time was forced to place a significant part of orders for the production of weapons abroad, since its capacities were not enough.
And the point here is not the tricks of the fifth column, as some people think, but the specifics of historical development. Yes, before the First World War, Russia fed all of Europe with bread; agriculture was the flagship of the economy. Although the industry was developing by leaps and bounds, it lagged far behind the leading countries of Europe.
The main areas of activity of the new minister include the following:
Creation of automobile parts;
Imperial Air Force (although there is a huge merit here to one of the relatives of Nicholas II, but this will be discussed in detail in the corresponding article);
Creation of military counterintelligence;
Introduction of machine gun teams in infantry regiments and air squads in corps;
The disbandment of reserve and fortress (fortress garrisons) units, due to which it was possible to strengthen the field armies, the total number of corps increased from 31 to 37.
Necessary changes were made in the officer corps, since part of it did not correspond to the command positions they occupied.
Hundreds of officers were dismissed due to their incompetence. A similar phenomenon, meaning incompetence, was characteristic not only of the Russian army of that period, but also, for example, of the English army. In Great Britain, even during the war, positions and titles were received by origin, and not by skill and merit. We began to fight this before the start of hostilities.
The Tsarist army was a fairly large organized group of people with a gigantic mobilization reserve by the standards of that time.
The ground forces consisted of a standing army and a militia.
The standing army, in turn, was divided into a regular army and a reserve, Cossack troops and foreign units.
In peacetime, there were almost 1.5 million people in the army; in 45 days, with the announcement of general mobilization, it could be increased to 5 million people (which happened in August 1914).
Those liable for military service were men aged from 21 to 43 years.
At that time, they served in the infantry for 3 years, which made it possible to constantly have more than 60% of the personnel of the lower ranks of the 2nd and 3rd years of service, that is, soldiers sufficiently trained to conduct active combat operations.
At the end of his term of active service in the ground forces, a person was in the 1st category reserve for 7 years, and 2nd category for 8 years.
In the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 170 million people, so not all citizens of military age were conscripted, but about half. The rest who did not serve, but were fit by all criteria, were enrolled in the militia. This included the majority of men aged 21 to 43 years.
The militia was divided into two categories.
Also, people were accepted into the Russian army on a voluntary basis, which gave some privileges. If you want to serve and have good health, you are welcome.
It is worth noting that representatives of not all nationalities were subject to military conscription. These were Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, and small peoples of the North.
True, mountaineers from the Caucasus could still get into active service, thanks to the “foreign troops” (irregular cavalry units formed on a voluntary basis).
The Cossacks were a separate military class, but we will talk about this in a separate article.
In peacetime, the territory of the Empire was divided into 12 military districts, led by military commanders: St. Petersburg, Vilna, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Irkutsk and Amur.
Before the war, there were 208 infantry regiments in the imperial army. The field army was divided into 37 army corps: Guards, Grenadier, I-XXV Infantry, I-III Caucasian, I and II Turkestan, I-V Siberian.
These corps included all infantry divisions with their own artillery. The staff composition of the corps was as follows: two infantry divisions, a light howitzer division (two 6-gun batteries), and an engineer battalion.
In each infantry regiment of 4 battalions (16 companies) according to the state on May 6, 1910, there was a machine gun team with 8 Maxim heavy machine guns. In wartime, the regiment was supposed to have a staff of 3,776 people. Our direct opponents, the Germans, had six machine guns (7.92 mm MG08 machine gun), 12 companies per regiment.
The main weapon of the infantrymen was a 7.62 mm Mosin rifle mod. 1891. The rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack versions. In 1910, due to the introduction of a new cartridge, modernization was required. Thus, a new curved sighting bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the trajectory of the bullet.
Despite the fact that the rifle was produced at three weapons factories, the factories still could not cope with the required production volumes. Therefore, orders were forced to be placed in the USA and France. This significantly increased the cost of rifle production, but there was nowhere to go.
As already written above, a machine gun team was introduced into the infantry regiment. This was a significant step to increase the firepower of infantry units, since before this machine guns were purchased mainly by the naval department, and they were intended for placement in fortresses. With a gun carriage and a weight of 250 kg, this was not surprising. BUT! During the Russian-Japanese War, the Russian army was able to evaluate the effectiveness of this type of weapon and the severe need for the infantry to have it.
The machine gun was modernized, and in the infantry version it began to weigh about 60 kg. Which significantly increased its mobile properties.
Since 1914, armored vehicles have been actively introduced into the Russian army.
The first field radio stations, created by Popov and Troitsky, appeared in the armed forces back in 1900. By 1914, radios had become, if not a competitor to wireline telephone communication, then an assistant.
By 1914, “spark companies” were created in all corps, the world’s first electronic warfare units, born during the Russo-Japanese War and which received further recognition and development.
Military science developed, the works of a number of military theorists were published: N. P. Mikhnevich - “Strategy”, A. G. Elchaninov - “Conducting modern combat”, V. A. Cheremisov - “Fundamentals of modern military art”, A. A. Neznamov - “Modern War”.
In 1912, the “Field Service Charter”, “Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Combat”, in 1914 “Manual for Infantry Operations in Combat”, “Manual for Firing from a Rifle, Carbine and Revolver” were published.
The main type of combat operations was considered to be offensive, but much attention was also paid to defense. The infantry attack used intervals of up to 5 steps (sparrier battle formations than in other European armies).
It was allowed to crawl, move in dashes, advance in squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire from comrades. The soldiers were required to dig in, not only in defense, but also during offensive operations.
Counter combat and actions at night were studied. Cavalrymen were taught to operate not only on horseback, but also on foot.
Although work on reforming the army was in full swing, and there were significant progress, there were some negative aspects.
Part of the officer corps resisted the changes, dependence on arms supplies from foreign companies had a negative impact, little attention was paid to the training of reserves, only the Cossacks regularly conducted reviews and exercises.
The militia was poorly trained or had no training at all. This will subsequently affect the neglect of the development of heavy artillery (but more on that in a separate article), and the hope for a quick war (hence the insufficient supply of shells).
The idea of building a large number of railways in the west of the empire, which during the war would speed up the mobilization, transportation and supply of the army, was not fully realized.
But here we also depended on Western “friends”, don’t be surprised by the quotation marks, they wanted to take a loan for this event from England. The same country that almost 10 years ago helped Russia’s opponents.
Wars always start unexpectedly, and we can say that the Russian Imperial Army was ready for war, not 100%, but ready. But why she suffered defeats in a number of major battles is a topic for a separate discussion.
In any case, even though the reforms in the Russian army were not completed, it was far from the same army that fought at Mukden and Port Arthur. The unpleasant lessons were learned, and RIA embarked on the path of evolution.
At the beginning of the First World War
The Russian Imperial Army numbered 1,350,000 people, at mobilization
deployed to 5,338,000; in service there were 6848 light and 240 heavy
guns, 4157 machine guns, 263 aircraft, over 4 thousand cars. For the first time in
history of Russia had to maintain a continuous front 900 kilometers long and
up to 750 kilometers deep and deploy an army of more than five million
Human. The war demonstrated many innovations: air combat,
chemical weapons, the first tanks, and “trench warfare”, which rendered it useless
Russian cavalry. However, the most important thing was that the war was clearly
demonstrated all the advantages of industrialized powers. Russian
empire, with its relatively undeveloped compared to Western Europe
industry, experienced a shortage of weapons, primarily so
called "shell hunger".
On
In 1914, only 7 million 5 thousand shells were prepared for the entire war. Their stocks
the warehouses ended after 4-5 months of hostilities; Russian
industry produced only 656 thousand shells for the entire year 1914 (that is,
covering the army's needs for one month). Already on the 53rd day of mobilization, 8
September 1914 Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich
addresses the emperor directly: “For about two weeks now it has been felt
lack of artillery cartridges, which I stated with a request to speed up
delivery. Now Adjutant General Ivanov reports that he must suspend
operations on Przemysl and along the entire front until the cartridges are brought to
local parks at least up to a hundred per gun. Now there are only twenty
five. This compels me to ask Your Majesty to order the delivery to be expedited
cartridges." Characteristic in this case were the responses of the War Ministry, headed by
Sukhomlinov that “the troops are shooting too much.”
Grand DukeNikolai Nikolaevich
During 1915-1916, the severity
shell crisis was reduced due to an increase in its own
production and import; in 1915, Russia produced 11,238 million shells, and
imported 1,317 million. In July 1915, the empire moved to mobilize the rear,
forming a Special Conference on the Defense of the Country. Until this time the government
traditionally tries to place military orders whenever possible on the military
factories, not trusting private ones. At the beginning of 1916, the Conference nationalized two
The largest factories in Petrograd are Putilovsky and Obukhovsky. At the beginning of 1917
the shell crisis was completely overcome, and the artillery even had
excessive number of shells (3 thousand for a light gun and 3,500 for a heavy one,
at 1 thousand at the beginning of the war).
On
at the end of mobilization in 1914, there were only 4.6 million in the army
rifles with the army itself being 5.3 million strong. The front's needs amounted to
100-150 thousand rifles monthly; in 1914, only 27 thousand were produced.
The situation was corrected thanks to the mobilization of civilian enterprises and
import. Modernized machine guns of the Maxim system and
Mosin rifles of the 1910 model, new guns of 76-152 mm calibers, Fedorov assault rifles.
Relative
underdevelopment of railways (in 1913, the total duration of railways
in Russia is 6 times inferior to the United States) greatly interfered with the rapid transfer of troops,
organizing supplies for the army and large cities. First use of railways
turn for the needs of the front noticeably worsened the supply of Petrograd with bread and became
one of the reasons for the February Revolution of 1917 (with the start of the war the army took
one third of all rolling stock).
Putilov plant, Petrograd
Due to long distances,
According to German experts at the beginning of the war, the Russian conscript had to
cover an average of 900-1000 km to your destination, while in Western
In Europe, this figure averaged 200-300 km. At the same time in Germany
100 km² of territory accounted for 10.1 km of railways, in France - 8.8, in
Russia - 1.1; in addition, three quarters of Russian railways were
single track.
According to calculations by the German
Schlieffen plan, Russia will mobilize, taking into account these difficulties in 110
days, while Germany - in just 15 days. These calculations were good
known both to Russia itself and to the French allies; France agreed
finance the modernization of Russian railway communication with the front.
In addition, in 1912 Russia adopted the Great Military Program, which should
was to reduce the mobilization period to 18 days. By the beginning of the war, much of this was still
was not implemented.
WITH
At the beginning of the war, Germany blocked the Baltic Sea, and Türkiye blocked the Black Sea
straits. The main ports for the import of ammunition and strategic raw materials became
Arkhangelsk, freezing from November to March, and non-freezing Murmansk, in 1914
for a year there was no railway connection with the central regions. Third
In terms of importance, the port, Vladivostok, was too remote. The result was that
in the warehouses of these three ports by 1917 a significant amount was stuck
military imports. One of the measures of the Conference on the Defense of the Country was the reworking
narrow gauge railway Arkhangelsk - Vologda to a regular one, which allowed
increase transportation threefold. Construction of the railway also began
to Murmansk, but it was completed only by January 1917.
Construction of the Murmansk railway, 1916
With the outbreak of the war the government
conscripted a significant number of reservists into the army, who stayed in the rear
for the duration of training. A serious mistake was that, in order to save three
quarters of the reservists were stationed in cities, at the location of units,
the replenishment of which they were supposed to become. In 1916 a conscription was held
older age category, which considered itself not subject to mobilization and perceived
the order is extremely painful. In Petrograd and its suburbs alone it was stationed
up to 340 thousand soldiers of spare parts and units. They were located in
overcrowded barracks, next to an embittered civilian population
hardships of wartime. In Petrograd, 160 thousand soldiers lived in barracks,
designed for 20 thousand. Moreover, in Petrograd there were only 3.5 thousand.
policemen and several companies of Cossacks.
Already
in February 1914, former Minister of Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo submitted
an analytical note to the emperor, in which he states, “in case of failure,
the possibility of which, when fighting such an enemy as Germany, cannot be ignored
to foresee the social revolution in its most extreme manifestations in our country
inevitable. As already indicated, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be
attributed to the government. Legislative institutions will begin to rage against
his campaign, as a result of which revolutionary revolutions will begin in the country
speeches. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans,
the only ones that can raise and group broad sections of the population:
first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all valuables and property.
The defeated army, having also lost during the war its most reliable
of its personnel, covered in most of it spontaneously by the general
peasant desire for land, will be too demoralized to
serve as a bastion of law and order. Legislative institutions and deprived
oppositional intellectual parties have real authority in the eyes of the people
will not be able to hold back the diverging waves of people, raised by them, and
Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be predicted
foresight."
General V.I. Gurko, 1916-1917
By the winter of 1916-1917, paralysis
supplies to Moscow and Petrograd reached their peak: they received only a third
the necessary bread, and Petrograd, in addition, only half of the required fuel.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stürmer, proposed in 1916 a project for the evacuation of
Petrograd had 80 thousand soldiers and 20 thousand refugees, but this project was never implemented.
By the beginning of the First World War
the composition of the corps has changed. Instead of three, he began to include only two infantry
divisions, and the cavalry Cossack regiment began to be created in wartime, no longer under
each infantry division, and with the corps.
in winter
1915-1916 General Gurko reorganized the armed forces according to the same
the principle that a year before Germany, and then France. Only the Germans and
the French in the divisions now had 3 regiments, and the Russians had 4 left, but the regiments themselves
were transferred from 4 to 3 battalions, and cavalry ones - from 6 to 4 squadrons. This
made it possible to reduce the accumulation of fighters on the front line and reduce their losses. A
the striking power of the divisions was maintained since they still had the same number
artillery, and the number of machine gun companies and their composition increased, machine guns in
there were three times more connections.
General A.A. Brusilov (third from right) in the Council of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, April 1, 1916
From the memoirs of A. Brusilov: “On this
since my front was given relatively significant means for attack
enemy: the so-called TAON - the main artillery reserve of the Supreme
commander-in-chief, consisting of heavy artillery of various calibers, and two
army corps of the same reserve were to arrive in early spring. I'm quite
was confident that with the same careful preparation that was carried out in the previous
year, and the significant funds that were released, we could not help but have in
1917 good success. The troops, as I said above, were in solid
mood, and one could hope for them, with the exception of the 7th Siberian
corps, which arrived at my front in the fall from the Riga region and was in
fluctuating mood. An unsuccessful measure caused some disorganization
the formation of third divisions in corps without artillery and the difficulty of forming
these divisions were supplied with convoys due to a lack of horses, and partly also of fodder. Doubtful
there was also the condition of the horse stock in general, since oats and hay were delivered
there was extremely little from the rear, and there was no way to get anything on the spot, so
how everything had already been eaten. We break through the enemy's first fortified line,
certainly they could, but further advancement to the west with a lack and weakness
the horse composition became doubtful, which I reported and urgently asked
quickly help this disaster. But at Headquarters, where Alekseev (Gurko) had already returned
again accepted the Special Army), and also in St. Petersburg there was obviously no time for the front.
Great events were being prepared that would overturn the entire way of Russian life and
destroyed the army that was at the front.
In
during the February Revolution, the day before the abdication of the last Russian
Emperor Nicholas II, the Petrograd Council issued order No. 1, which abolished the principle
unity of command in the army and established soldiers' committees in military units and on
courts This accelerated the moral decay of the army, reduced its combat effectiveness and
contributed to the increase in desertion."
Emperor Nicholas II, February 1917
Ammo for what's coming
so much offensive was prepared that even with a complete stop of all
Russian factories would be enough for 3 months of continuous battle. However, you can
remember that the weapons and ammunition accumulated for this campaign were later enough
for all civilian life, and there were still surpluses, which in 1921 the Bolsheviks
given to Kemal Pasha in Turkey. In 1917, preparations were being made for the introduction of a new
forms of clothing that are more comfortable and at the same time made in the Russian national
spirit, which should have further raised patriotic sentiments. This
the uniform was made according to the sketches of the famous artist Vasnetsov - for soldiers
instead of caps, pointed cloth hats - “heroes” (those
the very ones that would later be called “Budenovkas”), beautiful overcoats with “conversations”,
reminiscent of Streltsy caftans. Light and practical ones were sewn for officers
leather jackets (those that commissars and security officers will soon be sporting).
TO
By October 1917, the size of the army reached 10 million people, although at the front
there were only about 20% of its total population. During the war it was mobilized
19 million people - almost half are men of military age. The war has become
the most difficult test for the army. By the time we exited the war, Russia's losses
more than three million people were killed.
The well-known arguments that the Russian army entered the war completely unprepared, and because of its “backwardness” was forced to atone for the lack of weapons and equipment with soldiers’ blood and courage, are nothing more than amateurish or propaganda fables. Just look at the numbers to see otherwise. She already showed herself at a high level in the Japanese War and lost not for military, but for political reasons. And the assessments of foreigners very often turned out to be subjective. Thus, the German General Staff issued a categorical verdict: “The positional war proved the inability of the Russians to fight,” because it itself had not yet understood the trends of modern warfare. And the British attache, having visited a Russian garrison on the Afghan border, noted with surprise that there was “not a single tennis court” there. From which he concluded that “laziness and lack of interest in physical exercise” reign in the Russian army.
Well, after the Japanese War, a serious reorganization was carried out in the armed forces, colossal work was carried out to eliminate the shortcomings that emerged during the fighting. And by 1914, in terms of its technical equipment and level of training, the Russian army was significantly superior to most European armies, second only to the German one - but the Germans were purposefully preparing for war. During the reforms of 1906, the period of active service in Russia was reduced to 3 years, which made it possible to have an army of 1.5 million, two-thirds consisting of soldiers of the second and third years of service, and a significant number of reservists. The total period of service in the ground forces was 18 years: 3 - active, 7 - in the reserve of the first category, 8 - in the reserve of the second category. Those who did not serve, but were fit for duty, were part of the militia of two categories and were called “warriors”. The Russian infantry corps was approximately equal in size to the German one, but the division was larger - 21 thousand people. It consisted of 2 brigades, a brigade of 2 regiments, a regiment of 4 battalions (1 thousand each), and a battalion of 4 companies. The cavalry division consisted of 4 regiments of 6 squadrons each (one dragoon regiment, one uhlan, one hussar and one Cossack, and their numbers usually corresponded to the division number - so, the 10th cavalry division included, respectively, the 10th dragoon, 10th Ulansky, etc.). Its total strength was 4 thousand sabers, but unlike the German and French, the Russian cavalry division also included a machine gun team and a division of 12 guns.
The Russian army was armed with a three-line Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, a Nagant revolver of the 1895 model, and a Maxim machine gun, improved by Tula gunsmiths (of the 1910 model). All these weapons were better or, at least, no worse than their foreign counterparts. There were 8 machine guns per regiment - the same as the Germans and French. One of the best in the world were the rapid-firing three-inch (76 mm) guns of V.S. Baranovsky. The division had 48 guns (the Germans had 72, the French had 36). And in total there are 7030 guns in the Russian army (of which 240 are heavy). For comparison: in Germany - 9398 guns (1300 heavy and 996 siege), in Austria-Hungary 4083 (960 heavy and 338 siege), in France - 4800 (only a few heavy ones). The first field radio stations created by A.S. Popov and Captain Troitsky, were introduced back in 1900, were used in the Japanese, and by 1914 all corps had “spark companies”, telephone and telegraph communications were fully used.
Aviation was also used - the Russian army had 263 aircraft and 14 airships, the German army had 232 aircraft and 15 airships (they were also called zeppelins), France had 156 aircraft and 5 airships (and when Joffre was told about their usefulness, he waved it off: “ Well, it’s for sport!”). However, in this particular case it would be incorrect to judge equipment by quantity. Aviation was a completely new type of technology, it developed very quickly, and its capabilities were highly dependent on the year of manufacture. Some aircraft were already well adapted for combat missions, others were more repaired than flown. For example, the Russian fleet had excellent seaplanes M-5 and M-9, created by D.P. Grigorovich and considered the best in the world. In 1913, the Russian Knight multi-engine aircraft was designed at the Russian-Baltic Plant, and in 1914, on its basis, the Ilya Muromets bomber was built, which already had special suspensions for bombs, releasers and sights. For the pilots on this plane, a G.E. parachute was used. Kotelnikov. However, most of the airplanes available to the Russian ground forces were foreign-made and outdated models, unreliable and unarmed. The Russian army had more than 3,000 cars - while the German army... only 83. Yes, yes, the Germans generally underestimated vehicles and intended them only for advanced units.
Domestic inventors Fedorov, Tokarev, Roshchepey have already created samples of automatic rifles. In 1904, midshipman Vlasov and captain Gobyato invented and first used a mortar. Samples of light machine guns and “anti-aircraft” guns appeared. V.D. Menteleev designed the first all-terrain vehicle tank. True, these types of weapons were still at the development level, but by the beginning of the war they were not available in other armies. By the way, European armies did not yet have hand grenades - they were considered a very complex and dangerous weapon. The Germans, for example, if necessary, made grenades not in factories, but by sappers - and used them. The Russians were already producing grenades and began to enter their troops, and the new Instruction for infantry provided for throwing grenades at the enemy before a bayonet strike. But the units have not yet begun practical training in these actions.
In Soviet times, it was generally accepted that the Russian Imperial Army entered the First World War completely unprepared, was “backward” and this resulted in heavy losses, a shortage of weapons and ammunition. But this is not a completely correct judgment, although the tsarist army had enough shortcomings, as in other armies.
The Russo-Japanese War was lost not for military, but for political reasons. After it, colossal work was carried out to restore the fleet, reorganize forces, and eliminate shortcomings. As a result, by the First World War, in terms of its training and level of technical equipment, the Russian army was second only to the German one. But we must take into account the fact that the German Empire was purposefully preparing for a military solution to the issue of redistributing spheres of influence, colonies, domination in Europe and the world. The Russian imperial army was the largest in the world. After mobilization, Russia fielded 5.3 million people.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the Russian Empire was divided into 12 military districts plus the region of the Don Army. At the head of each was a commander of the troops. Men aged 21 to 43 were liable for military service. In 1906, the service life was reduced to 3 years, this made it possible to have an army of 1.5 million in peacetime, moreover, consisting of two-thirds soldiers of the second and third years of service and a significant number of reservists. After three years of active service in the ground forces, a person was in the 1st category reserve for 7 years, and 2nd category for 8 years. Those who did not serve, but were healthy enough for combat service, because Not all conscripts were taken into the army (there was an overabundance of them, a little more than half of the conscripts were taken), they were enrolled in the militia. Those enrolled in the militia were divided into two categories. The first category - in case of war, they were supposed to replenish the active army. The second category - those who were removed from combat service for health reasons were enrolled there; they planned to form militia battalions (“squads”) from them during the war. In addition, one could join the army at will, as a volunteer.
It should be noted that many peoples of the empire were exempted from military service: Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, and small peoples of the North. True, there were small numbers of “foreign troops.” These were irregular cavalry units, into which representatives of the Islamic peoples of the Caucasus could enroll on a voluntary basis.
Cossacks performed the service. They were a special military class, there were 10 main Cossack troops: Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Ural, Siberian, Semirechenskoe, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri, as well as Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk Cossacks. Cossack troops fielded “servicemen” and “militiamen.” “Service” were divided into 3 categories: preparatory (20 - 21 years old); combatant (21 - 33 years old), combatant Cossacks carried out direct service; spare (33 - 38 years old), they were deployed in case of war to make up for losses. The main combat units of the Cossacks were regiments, hundreds and divisions (artillery). During the First World War, the Cossacks fielded 160 regiments and 176 separate hundreds, together with Cossack infantry and artillery, more than 200 thousand people.
Cossack of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment.
The main organizational unit of the Russian army was the corps; it consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. During the war, each infantry division was reinforced with a mounted Cossack regiment. The cavalry division had 4 thousand sabers and 4 regiments (dragoons, hussars, ulans, Cossacks) of 6 squadrons each, as well as a machine gun team and an artillery division of 12 guns.
Since 1891, the infantry has been armed with a repeating 7.62 mm rifle (Mosin rifle, three-line). This rifle was produced since 1892 at the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories; due to a lack of production capacity, it was also ordered abroad - in France, the USA. In 1910, a modified rifle was adopted for service. After the adoption of the “light” (“offensive”) sharp-nosed bullet in 1908, the rifle was modernized, for example, a new curved sighting bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the bullet’s trajectory. By the time the empire entered World War I, Mosin rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack varieties. In addition, in May 1895, by decree of the emperor, the Nagan revolver chambered for the 7.62 mm cartridge was adopted by the Russian army. By July 20, 1914, according to the report card, the Russian troops had 424,434 units of Nagant revolvers of all modifications (according to the state there were 436,210), i.e. the army was almost completely provided with revolvers.
The army also had a 7.62 mm Maxim machine gun. Initially it was purchased by the navy, so in 1897-1904 about 300 machine guns were purchased. The machine guns were classified as artillery, they were placed on a heavy carriage with large wheels and a large armor shield (the mass of the entire structure was up to 250 kg). They were going to be used for the defense of fortresses and pre-equipped, protected positions. In 1904, their production began at the Tula Arms Factory. The Russo-Japanese War showed their high efficiency on the battlefield; machine guns in the army began to be removed from heavy carriages and, in order to increase maneuverability, they were placed on lighter and more easily transportable machines. It should be noted that machine gun crews often threw away heavy armored shields, having established in practice that in defense camouflage of a position is more important than a shield, and when attacking, mobility comes first. As a result of all the upgrades, the weight was reduced to 60 kg.
Maxim machine gun on a serf (“artillery”) carriage. 1915.
It was no worse than its foreign counterparts; in terms of the number of machine guns, the Russian army was not inferior to the French and German armies. The Russian infantry regiment of 4 battalions (16 companies) was armed with a machine gun team with 8 Maxim heavy machine guns as of May 6, 1910. The Germans and French had six machine guns per regiment of 12 companies. Russia met the war with good artillery of small and medium calibers, for example, a 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 (the basis of the field artillery of the Russian Empire) was superior in its combat qualities to the 75-mm rapid-fire French and 77-mm German guns and was highly praised by Russian artillerymen. The Russian infantry division had 48 guns, the Germans - 72, the French - 36. But Russia lagged behind the Germans in heavy field artillery (as did the French, British, and Austrians). Russia did not appreciate the importance of mortars, although there was experience of using them in the Russo-Japanese War.
At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an active development of military equipment. In 1902, automobile troops appeared in the Russian armed forces. By World War I, the army had more than 3 thousand cars (for example, the Germans had only 83). The Germans underestimated the role of vehicles; they believed that they were necessary only for advanced reconnaissance detachments. In 1911, the Imperial Air Force was established. By the beginning of the war, Russia had the most airplanes - 263, Germany - 232, France - 156, England - 90, Austria-Hungary - 65. Russia was the world leader in the construction and use of seaplanes (airplanes of Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich). In 1913, the aviation department of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in St. Petersburg under the leadership of I.I. Sikorsky built the four-engine aircraft "Ilya Muromets" - the world's first passenger aircraft. After the start of the war, the world's first bomber formation was created from 4 Ilya Muromets aircraft.
Beginning in 1914, armored vehicles were actively introduced into the Russian army, and in 1915, the first models of tanks began to be tested. The first field radio stations, created by Popov and Troitsky, appeared in the armed forces back in 1900. They were used during the Russo-Japanese War; by 1914, “spark companies” had been created in all corps, and telephone and telegraph communications were used.
Military science developed, the works of a number of military theorists were published: N.P. Mikhnevich - “Strategy”, A.G. Elchaninov - “Conducting modern combat”, V.A. Cheremisov - “Fundamentals of modern military art”, A.A. Neznamov - “Modern War”. In 1912, the “Field Service Charter”, “Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Combat” were published, in 1914 - “Manual for Infantry Operations in Combat”, “Manual for Firing from a Rifle, Carbine and Revolver”. The main type of combat operations was considered to be offensive, but much attention was also paid to defense. The infantry attack used intervals of up to 5 steps (sparrier battle formations than in other European armies). It is allowed to crawl, move in dashes, advance by squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire from comrades. The soldiers were required to dig in not only in defense, but also during offensive operations. We studied counter combat, operations at night, and Russian artillerymen showed a good level of training. Cavalrymen were taught to operate not only on horseback, but also on foot. The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was at a high level. The highest level of knowledge was provided by the Academy of the General Staff.
Of course, there were also shortcomings, for example, the issue of automatic weapons for infantry was not resolved, although promising developments existed (Fedorov, Tokarev and others worked on them). The mortars were not deployed. The preparation of the reserve was very poor; only the Cossacks conducted training and exercises. Those who dropped out and did not get into combat service had no training at all. Things were bad with the officer reserve. These were people who received higher education, they received the rank of ensign with a diploma, but had no idea about active service. The reserve also included officers who retired due to health, age, or misconduct.
Russia underestimated the capabilities of heavy artillery and succumbed to the influence of French theories and German disinformation (the Germans actively criticized large-caliber guns in the pre-war period). They realized it late, before the war they adopted a new program, according to which they planned to seriously strengthen the artillery: the corps was supposed to have 156 guns, of which 24 were heavy. Russia’s weak point was its focus on foreign manufacturers. Minister of War Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1909-1915) was not distinguished by high abilities. He was a smart administrator, but he was not distinguished by excessive zeal; he tried to minimize efforts - instead of developing domestic industry, he found an easier way. I chose it, ordered it, received a “thank you” from the manufacturer, and accepted the product.
Russian strategic plan on the eve of the First World War
The German Schlieffen plan was generally known in Russia. The Germans planted a fake on Russian intelligence, but the General Staff determined that it was a fake, and “by contradiction” they recreated the enemy’s true plans.
The Russian war plan provided for two war scenarios. Plan “A” - the Germans strike the first blow against France, and plan “D”, if not only Austria-Hungary fights against the Russian Empire, but the Germans also strike the first and main blow against us. In this scenario, the majority of Russian forces would move against Germany.
According to the first scenario, which was carried out, 52% of all forces (4 armies) were concentrated against Austria-Hungary. With counter strikes from Poland and Ukraine, they were supposed to destroy the enemy group in Galicia (in the Lviv-Przemysl region) and then prepare an offensive in the direction of Vienna and Budapest. Successes against Austria-Hungary were supposed to keep the Kingdom of Poland from a possible uprising. 33% of all forces (2 armies) were supposed to act against the German Empire. They were supposed to deliver converging attacks from Lithuania (from the east) and from Poland (from the south), defeat the Germans in East Prussia and create a threat to the central regions of Germany. Actions against Germany were supposed to draw back part of the forces of the German army that were acting against France. Another 15% of the forces were allocated to two separate armies. The 6th Army was supposed to defend the Baltic coast and St. Petersburg, and the 7th Army was to defend the border with Romania and the Black Sea coast.
After mobilization, the following were to be deployed against Germany: 9 corps (2 armies), they had 19 infantry divisions, 11 secondary infantry divisions, 9 and a half cavalry divisions. Against Austria-Hungary: 17 corps, they had 33.5 infantry divisions, 13 secondary infantry divisions, 18 and a half cavalry divisions. Two separate armies included 2 corps with 5 infantry divisions, 7 secondary infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions. Another 9 army corps remained in reserve at Headquarters, in Siberia and Turkestan.
It should be noted that Russia was the first country to create such operational formations as a front - the North-Western and South-Western Fronts. In other countries, all armies were confined to a single governing body - Headquarters.
Considering the fact that the mobilization dates of the Russian army were late compared to the German and Austro-Hungarian ones, Russia decided to remove the army deployment line from the German and Austro-Hungarian borders. So that the German and Austro-Hungarian armies would not be able to carry out a coordinated offensive on Bialystok or Brest-Litovsk and generally along the eastern bank of the Vistula in order to cut off the Russian armies from the center of the empire. Against the German forces, Russian troops concentrated on the line of Shavli, Kovno, the Neman, Bobr, Narev and Western Bug rivers. This line was almost five marches away from Germany and was a strong defensive line due to its natural properties. Against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, troops were to be concentrated on the line Ivangorod, Lublin, Kholm, Dubno, Proskurov. The Austro-Hungarian army was considered not so strong and dangerous.
The connecting factor was the fact that Russia assumed the obligation, simultaneously with France, to act against Germany. The French pledged to deploy 1.3 million people by the 10th day of mobilization and immediately begin military operations. The Russian side pledged to deploy 800 thousand people by this date (one must take into account the fact that the Russian army was scattered across the vast territory of the country, as well as mobilization reserves) and on the 15th day of mobilization to launch an offensive against Germany. In 1912, an agreement was made that if the Germans concentrated in East Prussia, then Russian troops would advance from the Narev to Allenstein. And in the event that German forces deploy in the Thorn, Poznan area, the Russians will strike directly at Berlin.
The emperor was to become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the actual leadership was to be carried out by the chief of staff, who became the head of the Academy of the General Staff, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yanushkevich. The post of quartermaster general, who was responsible for all operational work, was given to Yuri Nikiforovich Danilov. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was eventually appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The headquarters was created in Baranovichi.
The main weaknesses of the plan:
The need to launch an offensive before the mobilization and concentration of forces is completed. On the 15th day of mobilization, Russia could concentrate only about a third of its forces, which led to the fact that the Russian Imperial Army had to conduct the offensive in a state of partial readiness.
The need to conduct offensive operations against two strong opponents, it was impossible to concentrate the main forces against one of them.